Digital Milieu

The following interview was conducted on 29th March, 2011, comissioned by Theory Culture and Society, as following up of Alberto Toscano’s talk titled ‘Anti-sociology and its limit’ at the University of Essex, Feburary, 2011. In this interview, Alberto Toscano explains his critique of Jacques Ranciere: anti-sociology.

Interview with Alberto Toscano (Part 1) from Yuk Hui on Vimeo.

On Ranciere's anti-sociology and his relation to anarchism

Ranciere’s proposal of the equality as the starting point instead of a goal intrinsically sets himself against all hierarchical structures and　organization knowledge. Ranciere’s method based on the homonymy such as democracy/’democracy’, politics/police, etc, constantly challenges the existing governing rules that are nevertheless obstacles towards emancipation and the politics of equality. A true emancipation and equality, is found by Ranciere in the thought of the revolutionary school master Joseph Jacotot(1770-1840), whose pedagogical method sets against the opposition between the guardian and the ignorance. Ranciere proposes that one must think beyond the two legacies of Enlightenment, firstly one that gives the privilege to schoolmasters to educate the workers (golden communists vs iron workers); secondly the triumph of individualism over community[1].
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§1. Pourquoi encore la phénoménologie Husserlienne ?

Comment reprendre la phénoménologie Husserlien aujourd’hui après le mouvement connue comme la poste-phénoménologie française, surtout les travail de Jacques Derrida, Michel Henry, Jean-luc Marion, Bernard Stiegler, etc? Ne nous oublions pas que Heidegger a écrit lui-même en 1963, dans le texte « Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie» dédié à l’anniversaire de la maison d’édition Max Niemeyer Verlag qui a publié la plupart des livres de la phénoménologie, que l’époque de la phénoménologie est finie(vorbei), en particulier la phénoménologie comme une « science rigoureuse », la fondation de toutes les sciences. C’est aussi Heidegger lui qui a mis la fin à la phénoménologie husserlienne, et a marqué de la débout du existentialisme.

Derrida a montré dans son célèbre livre  L’introduction à l’origine de la géométrie  le problème de l’ignorance de l’écriture dans le système phénoménologique Husserlienne. Dans ce petit texte, Husserl a proposé de revenir à l’origine de la géométrie par la méthode phénoménologique. Ce terme phénoménologie tout d’abord signifie, simplement dire, une méthode cognitive aussi bien que une philosophie transcendantale. Ce que Derrida a montré est que cette méthode cognitive a besoin du supplément qui existe au dehors de la cognition, c’est à dire l’écriture, qui « assura la traditionalisation absolue de l’objet, son objectivité absolue »[1]. La question de l’écriture ouvre un nouveau domaine de recherche à partir de la phénoménologie Husserlienne, par exemple celui de la rétention tertiaire proposé par Stiegler.

En parallèle de la déconstruction Derridienne, il y avait un autre mouvement connu comme la naturalisation de la phénoménologie par les scientistes de cognition, notamment Francisco Varela etc. Varela a proposé de utiliser la réduction phénoménologie et les études de la science cognitive par exemple les données de l’électro-encéphalographie pour constituer les modèles de cognition. Le mouvement de la naturalisation épouse de la transformer en une discipline de la  science, mais non plus une philosophie transcendantale et une métaphysique. On se demande : c’est la fin de la phénoménologie?  On peut encore voire la phénoménologie dans le domaine scientifique, par exemple, ceux de Meuleau-Ponty et de Heidegger sont utilisés dans plusieurs domaines; notamment par le philosophe Américain Hubert Dreyfus dans sa critique de la raison de l’Intelligence Artificielle, mais la phénoménologie husserlienne ne importe rien. Nous, pourquoi parlons encore Husserl ici? Read the rest of this entry »

Parce que c’est un séminaire de muséologie, je voudrais parler des musées, et ainsi commencer par parler du Google Art Project, avant de parler plus généralement des digital studies. Je vais diviser cette présentation en trois parties : dans la première, je proposerai une interprétation du Google Art Project, dans la deuxième, je parlerai des objets numériques et de ce que l’on peut appeler « la technique des relations », avant de proposer quelques pistes de réflexions à ce sujet.

Le Google Art Project procède de la volonté de constituer des musées sur le web. Mais on doit se demander quel est le sens d’un tel projet ? Est-ce un simple projet de collection ? Comment penser la nature des choses qui seront ainsi présentées sur le web ? Par exemple : puisque ces choses seront des copies numériques, seront-elles moins authentiques ? Je pense que ce projet contient au fond la proposition suivant laquelle toute chose peut-être convertie en chose numérique – je ne parle pas encore d’ « objet numérique », mais bien de « choses » numériques. Le Google Art Projet est aussi un site social où l’on peut signer et collectionner les tableaux, et partager cela avec d’autres, via des réseaux sociaux tels que Facebook ou Google+. De ce fait ce projet crée un nouvel espace, un « environnement », qui déplace l’espace physique. Je dis déplace et non pas remplace : car la création de cet espace ne veut pas dire que l’espace physique va disparaître, mais qu’il devient lui-même inséparable de l’espace en ligne. Peut-être les mots « espace » ou « environnement » ne suffisent pas pour décrire ce changement de phase – ce déplacement. Je propose de comprendre cette situation en fonction de ce que Jacob Von Uexküll appelle « Umwelt » – et que l’on traduit le plus généralement en Français par le terme de « milieu ». Le « Umwelt » c’est ce qui situe entre l’environnement et les contextes, dans lequel les animaux interprètent le Umgebung, c’est à dire l’espace objectif, afin de produire leurs propres mondes. Von Uexküll donne l’exemple de la tique : la tique est un insecte qui n’a pas d’yeux, mais qui réagit à un certain nombre de signaux. Ces signaux, ce peut-être par exemple l’approche d’une vache : en fonction de ce signal, la tique se laisse tomber de l’arbre, et se retrouve sur le dos de l’animal. Un autre ensemble de signaux vont lui permettre ensuite de décider de l’endroit où elle va venir se loger. Suivant qu’elle trouve ou non cet endroit, elle décidera de rester – pouvant alors se nourrir – ou bien de retourner vers l’arbre. C’est au niveau de ces signaux que Von Uexküll trouve le lieu d’unification de ces espaces, et à partir duquel sont produits des mondes singuliers. Ce que l’on appelle le virtuel n’est pas, de ce point de vue, en opposition au réel – mais dans un rapport réciproque défini par ces signaux.

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[This interview was originally commissioned by  Theory, Culture and Society]

In November, 2010, Professor Beatriz Colomina gave a talk in Goldsmiths entitled ‘Multi-screen architecture’, where she suggested that ‘The state of distraction in the metropolis, described so eloquently by Walter Benjamin early in the twentieth century, seems to have been replaced by a new form of distraction, which is to say a new form of attention.’ (program abstract 2010) We recall Benjamin wrote in The Work of Art at the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, ‘Architecture has always represented the prototype of a work of art the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction…. Architecture [is] appropriated in a twofold manner: by use and by perception, or rather, by touch and sight. Such appropriation cannot be understood in terms of the attentive concentration of a tourist before a famous building …[Buildings are appropriated] not so much by attention as by habit.’ How then is Benjamin’s conception of the ‘state of distraction’ is further transformed today in the multi-screen architecture? What is the nature of this new form of distraction, which is widely known as Attention Deficit Disorder? How can we make sense of it, not as a symptom?

Professor Colomina approached the multi-screen culture from a very different perspective compared with authors who wrote on technology and culture,
her investigation starts with the 1959 US-USSR joined Exhibition in Moscow titled “science, technology and culture.” In that exhibition, the designers Ray and Charles Eames were commissioned to produce a multi-screen installation titled ‘Glimpses of the USA’. This installation on the one hand embeds the cold-war ideology: an American style of life; on the other hand it also anticipated a new form of attention and creative process which was already theorized by the Eames. Yuk Hui interviewed Professor Colomina on mult-screen architecture tracing this historical trajectory and the questions concerning attention deficit disorder, cold-war ideology, architecture and subjectivity. The interview was conducted on 14th January 2011 during her trip to London (where she delivered a talk in Architecture Association) Read the rest of this entry »

published in Issue 001 Computational Culture

Review of, Manual DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, the emergence of synthetic reason
London, Continuum, 2011
ISBN 1441170286
240 Pages

Manual DeLanda has been best known as a significant figure in the introduction of the works of Gilles Deleuze to the English speaking world with numerous examples of scientific phenomenon. Such an approach presents Deleuze as a scientifically informed philosopher who also used science and technology as a pivot to carry out a revolution within the field of French philosophy, as well as extending the philosophy of Deleuze to a broader range of areas that exceed Deleuze’s own endeavours. Four years after the publication of A New Philosophy of Society, Manual DeLanda has returned with a new title, Philosophy and Simulation—The emergence of synthetic reason, in which the name Gilles Deleuze only appears in the bibliography of the appendix. Shall we expect a new philosophy on the way, one not shadowed by the name Deleuze? A name nevertheless adds power to the history of philosophy, in Deleuze’s own words, the name of the father.

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An interview conducted by the french tech magazine Regard Sur Les Numérique(RSLN) with Bernard Stiegler in March 2011 after a workshop on the reflection of the phenomenon of open data. Some of the terms are not clear, for example, Stiegler’s idea of the economy of contribution, the idea of pollination from Yann Moulier Boutang, but it is a good introduction to the politics of metadata.

RSLN : What represents the development of open data in the grand adventure of digital technology?

Bernard Stiegler : It is the culmination of a major rupture already on its way, and which has nothing to do with the previous ones. All the technologies monopolised by the culture  industry, in a broad sense, for a century, are now at the mid of passing into the hands of the citizens.

It is an event of amplitude comparable to the appearance of alphabet which like the technique of publication, that is to say ‘made public’ (rendu public), is at the base of res publica, all like what has taken place after Gutenberg and the Reformation allowed access to printed words and knowledge.

At present, all the industrial, cultural and scientific activities leave a digital trace that everyone can exploit thanks to the tools that are more and more accessible. It is a major issue: that is an epochal change. And for thinking the phenomena of open data in a singular aspect, one must reflect on metadata: they are what render data active. Read the rest of this entry »

Critique of Information

Muriel Combes’ reading of the notion of information in Simondon is a faithful one, her introductory work to Simondon is exciting as well as critical. Her book was widely quoted in authors such as PaoloVirno, Alberto Toscano, etc. In fact, Simondon himself conflated several conceptualizations of information in cybernetics. In L’individuation psychique et collective, Simondon asks ‘Would it be possible to use the theory of Shannon, Fischer, Hartley, Norbert Wiener? What is common to all the authors who founded the theory of information is that for them information corresponds to the inverse of a probability[1]’. As demonstrated in the previous note, it would be problematic to simplify the definition of information as such. Simondon follows, ‘the theory of information is the point of departure of an ensemble of researches that have found the notion of negative entropy (or negentropy) showing that information correspond to the inverse of the processes of degradation and that, to the interior of all entire schema, information is not definable from a sole term such as the source, or such as the receptor, but from the relation between source and receptor’. Consequently, Simondonalso conflated the concept of information with the communication model proposed by Shannon and others,  ‘one could say that the receiver poses the question: what is the state of the source? And information is what brings the response to the receiver. That is why it is possible to represent the quantity of information as – log P, P being the probability of the state of the source.[2]’ In certain sense, Simondon adopts here the notion of information of Ralph Hartley, who used a very technical understanding of information in his 1928 paper Transmission of Information. Information for Hartley in this context is a measure of quantity that reflects on the receiver’s ability to reassure that it is an intended message.

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What exactly is information in the thoughts of Gilbert Simondon? Is it different from what has been understood by Claude Shannon and Norbert Wiener? This question seems to be crucial to understand firstly the concepts of transduction, individuation, amplification, disparity etc; secondly the relation between Simondon and cybernetics: is Simondon a cybernetician? But it seems to me that the responses from the commentators of Simondon remain unsatisfactory, firstly there is a misunderstanding of “information” in cybernetics; secondly Simondon tries to distant himself from his fellow cyberneticians, but in fact in his lecture notes and conference papers [60s and 70s] Simondon spoke like a neuroscientist today.

This series of notes attempt to understand the notion of information in Simondon and its relevant implications to address the current technological development. In fact, the misunderstanding of information seems to be normal, because even in cybernetics Shannon and Wiener share two different understandings of ‘information’. It seems that some commentators of Simondon tend to propose such correlation: Cybernetics- form, Simondon- information even though the term information was firstly made known by the cyberneticians. For example in Muriel Combes’s Simondon Individu et collectivité –Pour une philosophie du transindividuel, while explaining Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism Read the rest of this entry »

PhiloWeb 2011: The Second International Symposium on the Web and Philosophy

Co-located at Philosophy and Theory of AI Conference (PT-AI), October 5th 2011, Salonika, Greece.

URI: http://web-and-philosophy.org/philoweb2011_pt-ai_salonica/

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth-first century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been widely explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as an information space, the space of all items of interest identified by URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers, such as “http://www.example.org”). Originally conceived as an hypertext system of linked documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation, as URIs are used to identify everything from data on the Semantic Web and mobile code.

While the first Web and Philosophy Symposium at the Sorbonne explored the question of whether or not the Web and philosophy had any interaction, in this symposium we would like to focus on questions relating to the relationship between the Web and philosophical concepts of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. In particular, questions relating to the possible transformation of traditional philosophical concepts of language, logic, information, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment by the Web are especially pertinent. While for the last few decades a turn towards embodiment, sometimes even thought to be limited to the skin of the human body, has dominated the philosophy of the mind’s relationship with AI, with the advent of the Web questions of how our intelligence interacts with technology have now moved back to the forefront. Given human-scale problem solving on the Web as exemplified by Google or the vision of the Semantic Web, it seems that the question of replicating human intelligence in terms of AI may be know viewed as out-dated, and that a new vision of AI should be built that focuses on how technically-mediated human intelligence can be “amplified” over the Web, a vision very much in line with the original “Collective IQ” vision by Engelbart that was traditionally put forward as a competitor to the traditional AI visions of Minsky, McCarthy, and others.
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O Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa (ICS) acolhe dia 17 e 18 de Junho na Sala Polivalente a Conferência Internacional Rethinking Jaques Ellul and the Technological Society in the 21st Century.

ABSTRACT: Jacques Ellul provides us a rigorous method into the investigation of the technological reality. Ellul proposes that one must think of a technological system instead of a specific technology or collections of technical objects. That is to say, one should investigate systems or subsystems instead of arguing whether, for example the internet or television is good or bad, or seeing the technological reality as a composition of different independent technologies. Ellul further proposes some critical concepts such as autonomy, unity, universality and totality that allow us to further explore these systems . This paper want to proposes that (1) Ellul’s proposal is not only valid today, but also is the only useful method which allows us to understand the complexity and reassess our reality, especially at the moment we are witnessing the rapid convergence of technology and the process of globalization which is mainly technologically driven. This paper also wants to (2) reflect on the nature of the technological system described by Ellul: de-symbolization, which however was not made clear by Ellul. Drawing from Gilbert Simondon, Ellul proposes that the development of a technological system is the process of de-symbolization, in which ‘man’s inherent power of symbolizing is excluded’, he further complicated that ‘on the other hand, all consumption is symbolic’. The dialectical relation between the de-symbolization and re-symbolization constitutes the dynamic of Ellul’s technological system. The technological system is not a product of the capitalistic system, but rather the latter is engulfed by the former. Ellul in this sense reconstitutes the relationship between the technological and capitalistic system, technology correlates to the capital flow, but they don’t share a simple causality. This paper want to juxtapose this dialectics and suggest that we should take desymbolization further, and indeed in the current internet driven technological system, we are witnessing two more forms of de-symbolization that go further than the re-symbolization of consumption. The paper suggests that firstly the de-symbolization also implies the process of materialization, which is not what Simondon and Ellul perceived, the production of technical objects which are associated by different industrial standards and technical elements . Instead we are witnessing the materialization through creation of the universality of data especially under the current open data movement, which is not only technical objects, but also digital objects. Digital objects are subsumed under calculation and algorithmic control. Secondly, the desymbolization is also an externalization, which Ellul took from Andre Leroi Gourhan while he did not carry it further. This aspect of externalization is explored by the philosopher Bernard Stiegler . Stiegler calls this form of externality ‘tertiary retention’, which doesn’t only constitute the coherence and lineage of a technical system, but also man’s ability to mediate and anticipate . Through these two further dimensions of de-symbolization, the paper proposes to bring Ellul’s technological system back to the technological reality.